ORIGINAL

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Deputy

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PAULINE MEDINA, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

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JOSE HUIZAR, an individual; CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipality; and DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 18ST CV03011

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

First Cause of Action Retaliation (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a),(h))

Second Cause of Action Retaliation (Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b))

Third Cause of Action
Wrongful Termination in Violation of
Public Policy

Fourth Cause of Action
Failure to Prevent Discrimination
(Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k))

Fifth Cause of Action Workplace Harassment (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a),(h),(j))

Sixth Cause of Action
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

JONES LAW

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES | DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW Plaintiff Pauline Medina ("Ms. Medina" or "Plaintiff"), who brings this Verified Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") against Defendants—Jose Huizar, Councilmember for the City of Los Angeles' 14th District, in his individual capacity, the City of Los Angeles (the "City"), a municipality, and Does 1-10, inclusive (collectively, "Defendants")—alleging, based upon personal knowledge and information and belief, the following with respect to Defendants' identities and conduct:

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

- 1. Plaintiff Pauline Medina, a former City employee and longtime staffer in the office of Los Angeles City Councilman Jose Huizar, hereby brings this action pursuant to California's Fair Employment and Housing Act alleging that her employment was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for: (i) voicing discomfort and complaints about some of Huizar's and his office's practices that she believed violated local, state, and federal law; (ii) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair; and (iii) taking sick and disability leave on account of the stress, anxiety, and panic attacks she was suffering as a result.
- 2. In 2017, as did other of the Councilman's staffers, Ms. Medina became aware that Huizar was having another affair with one of the women that worked for him in his office. Ms. Medina had worked for Huizar for nearly a decade, so was aware of his previously-admitted affair in 2013 with his former deputy chief of staff and the resulting sexual harassment lawsuit that deputy filed against the Councilman and the City.
- 3. Ms. Medina recalled vividly the type of friction and hostility that Huizar's prior affair caused in the office and could see that the Councilman's new relationship was triggering the same type of issues. Ms. Medina, as did other of the Councilman's staffers, believed that Huizar's mistress was receiving more favorable treatment with respect to assignments and more leniency with respect to deadlines and attendance. So, in October 2017, Ms. Medina began speaking out about it and complained to Huizar's chief of staff.

- 4. Ms. Medina also at that time began complaining about certain practices employed by the Councilman's office that she believed violated local, state, and federal law, such as funneling City money to Huizar's high school alma mater, Salesian High School, and secretly using City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses.
- 5. Ms. Medina also began complaining at that time about the lack of boundaries between she and other staffers' responsibility for having to assist Huizar with his work agenda as opposed to his personal life. Huizar frequently demanded that Ms. Medina and other staffers pick up his dry-cleaning and contact lens refills, take his car to get washed, drop off and pick up his children from school, and even go to his house to move his wife's car from one side of the street to the other to avoid getting a street-sweeping ticket.
- 6. Ms. Medina had no choice but to speak up—both on account of her own morality and for her own sanity. Ms. Medina was the Councilmember's office manager and lead administrator, so was often the sounding board for other staffers who came to her with their own frustrations about the office's practices and Huizar's mistress' preferential treatment. This caused Ms. Medina extreme anxiety, which manifested in the form of debilitating migraines, stress-induced muscle pains, and panic attacks.
- 7. Huizar and his chief of staff retaliated against Ms. Medina for speaking out and undertook a campaign to push her out of the office. Among other things, Ms. Medina was stripped of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office, stripped of access to Huizar's calendar, subjected to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work, and subjected to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons.
- 8. Huizar and his chief of staff even went so far as to report Ms. Medina to the City's Personnel Department in order to instigate an audit of her attendance given that she had been taking days off on account of the migraines and anxiety she had been suffering as direct result of their retaliatory conduct. According to an investigator retained by the City Attorney's Office to examine the matter, Huizar and his chief of staff approached the Personnel Department about Medina (but not any other staffer) because the Councilman had suddenly become "curious" about Ms. Medina's sick leave.

- 9. Huizar's instigation of the attendance audit was pretextual—that is, retaliation for Ms. Medina's complaints about the office's practices and the preferential treatment given to Huizar's mistress. It was a show of force. Huizar wanted Ms. Medina to know the type of power and influence he could wield over various City departments and resources and that she would be powerless to challenge him.
- 10. Ultimately, Ms. Medina's primary care physician recommended that she take a medical leave of absence from work, which she did in beginning February 2018. When Ms. Medina returned to work in May 2018, however, the retaliatory campaign to push her out of the office resumed.
- 11. On her first day back in the office, Huizar's chief of staff met with Ms. Medina and "suggested" that she might be happier working in another City department. Ms. Medina knew exactly what the chief of staff was trying to convey—that he and Huizar were no longer happy with *her* and wanted her gone.
- 12. Ms. Medina spoke up again. She told Huizar's chief of staff that she was not going anywhere and that she knew they were trying to push her out for voicing her own and other staffers' complaints about the office. Huizar's chief of staff was infuriated. So, as immediate reprisal, he ordered Ms. Medina as her first task on her first day back at work to clean out the office's three storage rooms—a task normally delegated to student interns.
- 13. Ms. Medina was humiliated. She was the office manager and lead administrator but, as punishment for speaking out, was made to clear out heavy boxes, tables, chairs, and other junk from the office's storerooms as if someone was cleaning out their garage. In the course of doing so, Ms. Medina strained her back and suffered a panic attack.
- 14. Ms. Medina took another medical leave of absence as a result, but given what Huizar and his chief of staff had made clear would be her fate if she returned to the office, Ms. Medina had no choice but to resign her City employment in June 2018.
- 15. This lawsuit seeks to redress the financial and emotional harm Ms. Medina suffered, and continues to suffer, as a result of the discrimination and retaliation she endured while employed with Huizar, as well as on account of her constructive termination.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 16. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution, in that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement of this Court.
- 17. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Jose Huizar in this action pursuant to C.C.P. § 410.10, in that he is a resident of this state.
- 18. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the City of Los Angeles pursuant to C.C.P. § 410.10, in that the City is a municipality within this state.
- 19. Venue for this matter properly lies within Los Angeles County pursuant to C.C.P. §§ 395 and 395.5, in that Defendants' liability arises, and the injury to Plaintiff occurred, in whole or in part, within Los Angeles County.
- 20. Prior to the initiation of this action before this Court, Plaintiff properly exhausted her administrative remedies as required under FEHA by filing a complaint against Defendants with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") alleging, *inter alia*, the claims asserted herein. DFEH issued Plaintiff a "right-to-sue" letter on October 30, 2018. Accordingly, Plaintiff has fulfilled all preconditions to the filing of this FEHA-based suit. (Collectively attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of Ms. Medina's administrative complaint and right-to-sue letter.)

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PARTIES & RELEVANT NON-PARTIES

- Plaintiff Pauline Medina is an individual who, at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, was a resident of Los Angeles County, California.
- 22. Defendant Jose Huizar is an individual who, at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, was a resident of Los Angeles County, California. Huizar was at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, and continues to be as of the filing of this Complaint, a City Councilmember, representing the City's 14th District. Huizar took office in

2005 and, on account of City Council term limits, is expected to step down in 2020.

- 23. Paul Habib is an individual who, at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, was a resident of Los Angeles County, California. Habib was at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, and continues to be as of the filing of this Complaint, a City employee, serving as the chief of staff to Huizar.
- 24. Defendant City of Los Angeles is a public entity which, at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, employed Ms. Medina.
- 25. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times mentioned herein and otherwise relevant to the allegations of this Complaint, FEHA was in full force and effect, and binding on the City of Los Angeles, as the City regularly employed more than five persons within the State of California thereby bringing it within the provisions of FEHA's statutory scheme.
- 26. Given his position on the City Council and within his District's office, Huizar is a managing agent within the City and his District's office. He was able to exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in his office's decision-making such that his decisions ultimately determined office policy. Huizar had full responsibility for the operational functionality of his main office and field offices. He had the authority and discretion to dictate and implement policies and standards for the recruitment, hiring, and training of legislative, administrative, and operational staff; he had the authority and discretion to dictate and implement legislative and community action agendas; and he had the authority and discretion to dictate and implement formal policies and informal practices in his offices with respect to responding to complaints of workplace discrimination, harassment, and other complaints of perceived violations of the law and breaches of City rules and policies. The same is true of Habib.
- 27. Plaintiff herein alleges that the actions taken by employees of the City against Plaintiff, by Huizar and Habib in particular, occurred within the normal scope and course of these individuals' employment with the City. Plaintiff further alleges that several of these employee(s) were Plaintiff's supervisor(s) while Plaintiff was employed by the City. Thus, the City is vicariously liable for these individuals' actions under the doctrine of respondent superior.

- 28. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the defendants sued as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive (the "DOE Defendants") and, therefore, sues these DOE Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when such is ascertained.
- 29. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the DOE Defendants acted wrongfully, maliciously, intentionally and negligently; that each is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings complained of herein; and that Plaintiff's injuries, as alleged herein, were proximately caused by the DOE Defendants, either through each Defendant's own conduct or through the conduct of their agents and/or employees.
- 30. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, each of the Defendants, whether named or fictitiously named as a DOE Defendant, were the merging entity, merged entity, subsidiary, acquiring corporation, agent and/or employee of each of the remaining Defendants, and in doing the things hereinafter alleged, was acting within the course and scope of such agency and/or employment with knowledge, advice, permission and consent of each other.
- 31. As used herein, the term "Defendants" means all Defendants, both jointly and severally, and references by name to any one Defendant shall include and reference all Defendants, both individual, corporate and business entities, both specifically named and unnamed, and both jointly and severally to all.
- 32. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and on that basis allege, that at all times material to the allegations of this Complaint, Defendants caused, aided, abetted, facilitated, encouraged, authorized, permitted and/or ratified the wrongful acts and omissions described in this Complaint.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

33.

- Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 32, above, and repeats,
- reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 34. Pauline Medina worked for and was loyal to Councilman Jose Huizar for nearly a decade. She started as a City employee as a receptionist in one of his field offices in August 2008, but was ultimately transferred to the Councilman's main City Hall office.
- 35. Ms. Medina has a familial relationship with Huizar, which is how she initially got the position in 2008. Ms. Medina has a young son with one of Huizar's brothers. Still, Ms. Medina was never looking for a handout, just an opportunity to help provide for her family and thrive professionally.
- 36. And that is what she did. So, even when Ms. Medina's relationship with Huizar's brother came to an end in 2012, she continued to work in the Councilman's office and continued to excel in her role there. In fact, that same year (2012) Huizar made Ms. Medina his office manager and lead administrator.
- 37. In that capacity, Ms. Medina was generally responsible for all of the administrative innerworkings of the office, including the responsibility for processing payroll, time and attendance, event logistics, accounts payable, as well as processing monies allocated to the office from the City's General Purpose Fund. She also supervised the receptionist staff.
- 38. Huizar was challenging to work for, to say the least. Given the nature of the job and local politics, Ms. Medina certainly expected Huizar to be demanding; but being rude and unthanking in his demands was the rule with Huizar rather than the exception. And he would often chastise and verbally abuse Ms. Medina and other staffers for mistakes and oversights that were of his own making.
- 39. The job was also demanding in that Huizar saw no boundary between his staffers' responsibility for assisting him with his work agenda as opposed to his personal life. Huizar frequently demanded that Ms. Medina and other staffers pick up his dry-cleaning and contact

lens refills, take his car to get washed, drop off and pick up his children from school, even go to his house to move his wife's car from one side of the street to the other to avoid getting a street-sweeping ticket.

- 40. Nonetheless, Ms. Medina complied with Huizar's personal requests while also balancing the demands of her job. Ms. Medina never received a failing performance rating during her tenure as Huizar's office manager and lead administrator nor at any other time during her employment with the City.
- 41. Still, Ms. Medina endured a tremendous amount of angst and stress on account of her employment with Huizar. For instance, Ms. Medina was interviewed by the City Attorney's Office as part of a 2013 sexual harassment and retaliation lawsuit filed against Huizar and the City by Francine Godoy, the Councilmember's former deputy chief of staff.¹ Ms. Medina had never been involved in a lawsuit before and was unsettled by the experience. She was also unsettled by the lobbying Huizar seemed to be doing amongst those staffers that he knew would be interviewed or deposed in a not-so-subtle effort to persuade them to give testimony favorable to him and not Godoy. Moreover, Ms. Medina was personally disappointed in Huizar because she had spent a considerable amount of time with his wife and children while Ms. Medina was in a relationship with Huizar's brother.
- 42. Ms. Medina was also uncomfortable with certain practices employed by the Councilman's office that she believed violated local, state, and federal law. For instance, Ms. Medina was uncomfortable with the requirement that she and other Huizar staffers engage in fundraising activities for his high school alma mater, Salesian High School, while on City time. She was also uncomfortable with the direction she got, given her direct responsibility for processing monies allocated to the office from the City's General Purpose Fund, to find ways to funnel money to the school.
- 43. Ms. Medina was also uncomfortable syphoning money from the City's General Purpose Fund to pay for Huizar's personal expenses, like family gatherings and other events that

¹ Francine Godoy v. City of Los Angeles, et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BC524640.

were wholly unrelated to City business. Similarly, Ms. Medina was uncomfortable with the direction she got to utilize City funds to pay for prohibited activities, like golf tournament sponsorships and other gala events. Ms. Medina was often directed to make a "donation" to a non-profit organization, albeit with the unspoken agreement that the organization utilize part of the money it received to make a payment, by proxy, to wherever the Councilman's office wanted.

- 44. Ms. Medina had at the time a reasonable and good faith belief that the above-described activities constituted violations of City ethics rules and laws (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), state political activity laws (Cal Gov. Code §§ 3203, 3209, 19990), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 45. In or about the Spring of 2017, Ms. Medina became aware that Huizar was engaged in another extramarital affair with a City staffer. This caused friction in the office because many staffers, Ms. Medina among them, believed that Huizar's mistress received more favorable treatment from him with respect to assignments and more leniency with respect to deadlines and attendance.
- 46. During the year 2017, Huizar was engaged in a sexual relationship with one of his City staffers.
- 47. During the year 2018, Huizar was engaged in a sexual relationship with one of his City staffers.
- 48. As long as Ms. Medina had been in the office and directly responsible for processing time and attendance, the custom and practice—as well as the direction she received directly from Huizar and his chief of staff, Paul Habib—was to be lax with respect to deducting staffers' leave when they were out of the office. For years, it had been common practice for Huizar and Habib to direct Ms. Medina to not formally mark a staffer as out on vacation when they really were or as out on sick leave when they really were. Given the demands of the job and staffers' responsibilities for attending various events outside of normal working hours on nights and weekends, the direction Huizar and Habib routinely gave Ms. Medina was to not formally mark staffers as on leave as a matter of "goodwill."

- 49. So, for instance, if a staffer was getting married, Ms. Medina would be directed to not formally mark the days the staffer took off for their wedding and honeymoon. Or, for example, if a staffer experienced a death in the family, Ms. Medina would be directed to overlook the time taken off by that staffer for bereavement. In each instance, however, Ms. Medina would consult Huizar or Habib, who would then dictate to her when to formally deduct a particular staffer's leave or not.
- 50. However, that long-held practice changed when Huizar began his affair with another of his City staffers and wanted to know her particular whereabouts. Beginning in or about August 2017, the direction Ms. Medina received from Habib was that Huizar wanted her to send out an email each morning for his review setting out which staffers would be late or otherwise out of the office that particular day.
- 51. Ms. Medina could see right through the request and see that its true purpose was so that Huizar would know the whereabouts of his mistress. This was particularly evident because virtually every staffer had the ability to log on to their computers and phones remotely to keep up with their emails and other responsibilities regardless of their physical absence from the office. And if a staffer was not responsive to the Councilmember's emails or texts—regardless of whether they were on leave or not—Huizar would repeatedly email and text them until they responded. Huizar expected his staff to be available to him essentially 24/7.
- 52. The new "daily email" requirement became a significant stressor for Ms. Medina because she was forced to wrangle excuses out of staffers for why they would be late or otherwise out for the day. Ms. Medina had become the sounding board for other staffers who came to her with their own frustrations about the office's practices and Huizar's mistress' preferential treatment, particularly with respect to the new attendance policy. This caused Ms. Medina extreme anxiety, which manifested in the form of debilitating migraines, stress-induced muscle pains, and panic attacks.
- The new attendance policy was particularly stressful for Ms. Medina because Huizar's mistress would often turn to her for advice when she had no excuse for being late or absent, but wanted Ms. Medina's help covering for it. Oftentimes, the mistress would get caught

 in the lie, and yet because of her standing with Huizar, Ms. Medina would be blamed for the entire episode.

- 54. For instance, in October 2017, Huizar's mistress arrived late to work one day and told Habib, falsely, that she had been at a constituent meeting. When Habib discovered there had been no such meeting, he sat down with her to find out why she was not being truthful. Yet rather than take responsibility for her own conduct, the mistress told Habib that Ms. Medina advised her to make up the meeting as a cover for being late. Ms. Medina had certainly not given her that advice but, given the mistress' standing with Huizar, Habib took her side rather than Ms. Medina's and accused Ms. Medina of being deceptive.
- 55. Ms. Medina was incredulous. She was not the one who was late, not the one who lied about it, and yet she was somehow being blamed for it. So, Ms. Medina raised her concerns and complaints with Habib again, namely, that: (i) Huizar's mistress was receiving preferential treatment with respect to attendance and assignments; (ii) Ms. Medina was uncomfortable funneling money out of the City's General Purpose Fund; and (iii) Ms. Medina was suffering from migraines as a result of the stress.
- 56. Thereafter, Huizar and Habib retaliated against Ms. Medina for speaking out and undertook a campaign to push her out of the office. Among other things, Ms. Medina was stripped of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office, stripped of access to Huizar's calendar, subjected to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work, and subjected to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons.
- 57. Huizar and Habib even went so far as to report Ms. Medina to the City's Personnel Department in order to instigate an audit of her attendance given that she had been taking days off on account of the migraines she had been suffering as direct result of their retaliatory conduct.
- 58. Huizar's instigation of the audit was confirmed by a firm hired by the City Attorney's Office to investigate the matter. During an interview with a representative from the City's Personnel Department, a Personnel representative who had been personally involved told the investigator that, in February 2018, Habib approached their department and specifically

requested Ms. Medina's time and attendance records. According to the Personnel employee, Habib explained that Councilman Huizar had suddenly become "curious" about Ms. Medina's absences and wanted a report of the leave she had taken.

- 59. Of course, Habib did *not* ask the Personnel Department for a report on any other staffer's leave—only Ms. Medina's.
- 60. According to the Personnel Department, Habib then came back to them and advised that he had cross-referenced Ms. Medina's leave report with his own email records and that they did not match up.
- 61. Thereafter, on February 28, 2018, Habib asked the Personnel employee to accompany him to a meeting with Ms. Medina so that he could confront her with his "evidence" and place her on a more highly-scrutinized leave program whereby Ms. Medina would have to present a doctor's note for every single sick day she took henceforward.
- 62. During the meeting, Habib told Ms. Medina that the recommendation was that she be fired for her purported attendance discrepancies, but that "the Councilman wanted to give her another opportunity" because he is "very generous."
- 63. Ms. Medina was astounded by the accusations Habib was making since, as explained above, the attendance policy in the Councilman's office had been lax for years—and had been so at Habib's very direction. Moreover, Ms. Medina had always consulted Habib about staffers' time off and he was the one who would dictate to Ms. Medina when she should formally mark the leave down or not. Ms. Medina responded during the meeting that other staffers—including Habib himself—routinely failed to submit leave requests for the days they took off and the instances for which they were late, but Habib rationalized that other staffers were merely "telecommuting" with his permission due to undefined "personal issues."
- 64. Unsurprisingly, the City's investigator did *not* interview any of Huizar's other staffers with respect to the office's attendance practices. The investigator relied only upon Habib's (false and self-serving) representations.

- 65. Ms. Medina was also astounded by the accusations Habib was making because she understood very well the underlying subtext. Huizar and Habib were sending Ms. Medina a message: they wanted Ms. Medina to know the type of power and influence they could wield over various City departments and resources and that she would be powerless to challenge him.
- 66. The instigation of the attendance audit was pretextual. It was in retaliation for Ms. Medina's complaints about the office's practices and the preferential treatment given to Huizar's mistress.
- 67. Ms. Medina left the meeting so overwhelmed that she had a panic attack.

 Her primary care physician recommended that she take a medical leave of absence from work, which she did. Ms. Medina took leave from on or about February 28 to May 1, 2018.
- 68. When Ms. Medina returned to work, however, the retaliatory campaign to push her out of the office resumed. According to the City Attorney's Office's investigator, Habib did not think that Ms. Medina would return to work; he thought he had succeeded in conveying the power he and Huizar could lord over her and that Ms. Medina would just quit.
- 69. Therefore, on Ms. Medina's first day back in the office, Habib summoned her to a meeting with he and Rick Coca, Huizar's director of communications. During that meeting, acting at Huizar's direction, Habib "suggested" to Ms. Medina that she might be happier working in another City department and offered to help her transition out of the Councilman's office.
- 70. But Ms. Medina knew exactly what he was trying to convey—that he and Huizar were no longer happy with *her* and wanted Ms. Medina gone because of her complaints. Ms. Medina knew too much and was no longer going to stay quiet about it, so she had to go.
- 71. Undeterred, Ms. Medina spoke up again. She told Habib that she was not going anywhere and that she knew they were trying to push her out for voicing her own and other staffers' complaints about the office.
- 72. Habib was infuriated. So, as immediate reprisal, he ordered Ms. Medina as her first task on her first day back at work to clean out the office's three storage rooms, one of which was located down in City Hall's underground parking lot.

- 73. Ms. Medina was humiliated. It was punishment. Instead of the going to her desk to resume her normal office duties, she had been sent to the office's storerooms in a dress to clear out heavy boxes, tables, chairs, and other junk as if someone was cleaning out their garage. In the course of doing so, Ms. Medina strained her back and suffered a panic attack.
- 74. As a result, Ms. Medina went to urgent care where her primary care physician recommended that take another medical leave of absence, which she did.
- 75. Given what Huizar and Habib had made clear would be her fate if she returned to the office, Ms. Medina had no choice but to resign from her City employment, which she did on June 20, 2018.
- 76. As a result of being retaliated against and stripped of any meaningful function at the office, Ms. Medina was constructively terminated. Huizar and Habib intentionally created and knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable that any reasonable and comparably-situated employee would be compelled to resign. Ms. Medina felt that she had no other option but to resign rather than endure the ridicule, shame, and uselessness associated with her diminished position in the office.

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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Retaliation

In Violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (h)

(Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 77. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 76, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 78. Section 12940(h) of the California Government Code makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for "oppos[ing] practices forbidden under [FEHA's statutory scheme] or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [FEHA's statutory scheme]."
- 79. As described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, Plaintiff engaged in such protected conduct under FEHA by complaining to and about Defendants' conduct. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns and complaining about having to funnel City money to Huizar's high school alma mater; (ii) voicing concerns and complaining about having to secretly use City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses; (iii) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair; and (iv) taking disability and sick leave as recommended by her primary care physician (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV)).
- 80. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated a law or administrative statute (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), state political activity laws (Cal Gov. Code §§ 3203, 3209, 19990), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 81. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendants' decision to constructively terminate Plaintiff's employment and, prior thereto, to subject her to abusive and harassing retaliatory employment

practices. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against her.

- 82. In response to Plaintiff's protected activities, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff, including, but not limited to: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping Plaintiff of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office; stripping Plaintiff of access to Huizar's calendar; subjecting Plaintiff to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work; subjecting Plaintiff to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons; and unjustifiably subjecting Plaintiff to an attendance audit by the City's Personnel Department (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV)).
- 83. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 84. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 85. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 86. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with

oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.

87. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to, *inter alia*, section 12965(b) of the California Government Code.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Retaliation

In Violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b) (Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 88. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 86, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 89. Section 1102.5(b) of the California Labor Code makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for "disclosing information . . . to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance . . . of state or federal statute . . . or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee's job duties."
- 90. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff engaged in such protected conduct under section 1102.5 by complaining to and about Defendant's conduct, as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns and complaining about having to funnel City money to Huizar's high school alma mater; (ii) voicing concerns and complaining about having to secretly use City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses; (iii) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair; and (iv) taking disability and sick leave as recommended by her primary care physician (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV)).
- 91. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated a law or administrative statute

(Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), state political activity laws (Cal Gov. Code §§ 3203, 3209, 19990), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).

- 92. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to constructively terminate Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against her.
- 93. In response to Plaintiff's protected activities, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff, including, but not limited to: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping Plaintiff of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office; stripping Plaintiff of access to Huizar's calendar; subjecting Plaintiff to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work; subjecting Plaintiff to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons; and unjustifiably subjecting Plaintiff to an attendance audit by the City's Personnel Department (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV)).
- 94. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 95. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 96. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice

pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.

- 97. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.
- 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to, *inter alia*, section 1102.5(f) of the California Labor Code.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 99. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 98, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 100. The discharge of an employee in retaliation for resisting or complaining about employer violations of laws that secure important public policies contravenes those policies, and gives rise to a common law action in tort.
- 101. Plaintiff engaged in such protected conduct under FEHA and under section 1102.5 of the Civil Code by complaining to and about Defendants' conduct, as described above. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: voicing concerns and complaining about having to funnel City money to Huizar's high school alma mater; (ii) voicing concerns and complaining about having to secretly use City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses; (iii) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair; and (iv) taking disability and sick leave as recommended by her primary care physician (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV)).

- 102. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated the City's ethics and integrity rules, or were otherwise violations of a law or administrative statute (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), state political activity laws (Cal Gov. Code §§ 3203, 3209, 19990), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 103. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to constructively terminate Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against her.
- 104. Plaintiff was harassed and subsequently constructively terminated for asserting her statutory and constitutional rights to engage in protected activity. Defendants' violation of Plaintiff's statutory and constitutional rights is inconsistent with, and hostile to, the public's interest in correcting violations of state and federal laws and regulations, and has a chilling effect on reports of such actual and suspected violations of state and federal laws and regulations.
- 105. Defendants' reasons for harassing Plaintiff and subsequently constructively terminating Plaintiff's employment are pretextual in nature and calculated to disguise the motivating bases of the adverse employment actions to which Plaintiff was subjected.
- 106. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 107. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.

	108.	Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts
direct	ed towa	rd Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's
right	to be fre	e from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice
pursu	ant to se	ection 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff
to pu	nitive da	mages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.

109. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Failure to Prevent Unlawful Discrimination In Violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k) (Against the City of Los Angeles and Does 1-10)

- 110. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 109, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 111. Section 12940(k) of the California Government Code makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring."
- As described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct under FEHA by complaining to and about Defendant's conduct. In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns and complaining about having to funnel City money to Huizar's high school alma mater; (ii) voicing concerns and complaining about having to secretly use City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses; (iii) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair; and (iv) taking disability and sick

leave as recommended by her primary care physician (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV)).

- 113. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated the City's ethics and integrity rules, or were otherwise violations of a law or administrative statute (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), state political activity laws (Cal Gov. Code §§ 3203, 3209, 19990), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 114. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to constructively terminate Plaintiff's employment, as well as to subject her to the abusive, harassing, and retaliatory adverse employment actions as described above. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against her.
- Plaintiff, including, but not limited to: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping Plaintiff of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office; stripping Plaintiff of access to Huizar's calendar; subjecting Plaintiff to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work; subjecting Plaintiff to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons; and unjustifiably subjecting Plaintiff to an attendance audit by the City's Personnel Department (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).
- 116. Defendants failed to take reasonable steps necessary to prevent the discrimination, harassment, and retaliation that Plaintiff was subjected to from occurring.
- 117. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them,
 Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual,
 consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income,
 salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in
 Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to
 proof at the time of trial.

- 118. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 119. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 120. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.
- 121. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to, *inter alia*, section 12965(b) of the California Government Code.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Workplace Harassment

In Violation of Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (h), (j)

(Against Jose Huizar, in his individual capacity, and Does 1-10)

- 122. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 121, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 123. Section 12940, subsections (a) and (j), of the California Government Code make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against and harass an employee because of "physical disability, mental disability, medical condition."
 - 124. As averred in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, in October 2017,

Ms. Medina informed Defendants, as well as Defendants' agents and subordinates, that she was uncomfortable with certain practices employed by the Councilman's office that she believed violated local, state, and federal law. Thereafter, Defendants, and Huizar in particular, as well as Defendants' agents and subordinates, personally singled Ms. Medina out for retaliation and disparate treatment with regard to the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment because of Ms. Medina's complaints, sick leave, and short-term disability leave in violation of Sections 12940 and 12945. In particular, Defendants' retaliatory and disparate treatment of Ms. Medina included, but was not limited to: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping Plaintiff of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office; stripping Plaintiff of access to Huizar's calendar; subjecting Plaintiff to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work; subjecting Plaintiff to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons; and unjustifiably subjecting Plaintiff to an attendance audit by the City's Personnel Department (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV)). Huizar personally undertook the foregoing actions as against Ms. Medina.

- 125. The actions of Defendants, and Huizar in particular, as well as those of their agents and subordinates, negatively affected the terms, conditions, and privileges of Ms. Medina's employment, and resulted in the constructive termination of Ms. Medina's employment.
- 126. Defendants, and Huizar in particular, as well as their agents and subordinates, did not treat non-sick, non-disabled, and non-complaint-lodging employees in the same manner in which Ms. Medina was treated; they were treated more favorably.
- 127. Similarly, section 12940(h) of the California Government Code makes it unlawful for an employer to harass an employee for "oppos[ing] practices forbidden under [FEHA's statutory scheme] or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under [FEHA's statutory scheme]."
- 128. As described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, Plaintiff engaged in such protected conduct under FEHA by complaining to and about Defendants' conduct.

In particular, Plaintiff's protected activity included, but is not limited to: (i) voicing concerns and complaining about having to funnel City money to Huizar's high school alma mater; (ii) voicing concerns and complaining about having to secretly use City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses; (iii) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair; and (iv) taking disability and sick leave as recommended by her primary care physician (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (*see infra* at Sect. IV)).

- 129. At the time in which Plaintiff engaged in such protected activities, Plaintiff held a good faith and reasonable belief that the alleged actions violated a law or administrative statute (Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Articles 9.5 and 9.7), state political activity laws (Cal Gov. Code §§ 3203, 3209, 19990), as well as federal political activity law (5 U.S.C. § 7321 et seq.).
- 130. Plaintiff's protected activities, as set forth herein, were individually and collectively a contributing factor in Defendant's decision to constructively terminate Plaintiff's employment and, prior thereto, subject her to abusive and harassing retaliatory employment practices. Plaintiff's protected activities were the sole, motivating, and but-for cause of the adverse employment actions Defendants took against her.
- particular, personally subjected Plaintiff to retaliatory harassment by, among other things: harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping Plaintiff of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office; stripping Plaintiff of access to Huizar's calendar; subjecting Plaintiff to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work; subjecting Plaintiff to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons; and unjustifiably subjecting Plaintiff to an attendance audit by the City's Personnel Department (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (*see infra* at Sect. IV)). Huizar personally undertook the foregoing actions as against Ms. Medina.
- 132. That is, Huizar personally subjected Plaintiff to verbal abuse, derogatory comments, and physical interference with freedom of movement. Huizar's conduct was beyond

the scope of his necessary job performance and was engaged in for personal gratification because of meanness or bigotry and for other personal motives. His conduct did not arise out of his normal and necessary personnel management duties.

- 133. Defendants, and Huizar in particular, as well as their agents and subordinates, have consistently failed to give any reasonable justification for subjecting Ms. Medina to the foregoing adverse employment actions. Ms. Medina alleges that these actions were taken by Defendants, and Huizar in particular, as well as their agents and subordinates, because of Ms. Medina's complaints, sick leave, and disability leave, in violation of Sections 12940 and 12945.
- 134. As a proximate result of the wrongful acts of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 135. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 136. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 137. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with

oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.

138. Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of attorneys' and experts' fees pursuant to, *inter alia*, section 12965(b) of the California Government Code.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

(Against Jose Huizar, in his individual capacity, and Does 1-10)

- 139. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 138, above, and repeats, reiterates, and realleges each and every allegation contained therein with the same force and effect as if such paragraphs were set forth fully at length here.
- 140. "A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is '(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct." *Hughes v. Pair*, 46 Cal. 4th 1035 (2009).
- 141. Defendants' conduct as described above—harassing and hassling Plaintiff both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping Plaintiff of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office; stripping Plaintiff of access to Huizar's calendar; subjecting Plaintiff to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work; subjecting Plaintiff to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons; unjustifiably subjecting Plaintiff to an attendance audit by the City's Personnel Department; and making Plaintiff clean out multiple storage rooms (as described in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint (see infra at Sect. IV))—goes beyond all possible bounds of decency of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.
- 142. Defendants devoted little or no thought to the probable distress such acts would cause Plaintiff, and simply acted in reckless disregard to the possibility that Plaintiff would suffer severe emotional distress as a result of such acts.

- 144. Defendants' conduct was outrageous and outside the normal scope of the employment relationship and was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's harm.
- 145. Defendants' acts subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship in violation of her rights as an employee under California law. Defendant acted with malice in that Defendants' actions were intended to injure Plaintiff, and did so, and because such despicable acts were carried out with a willful disregard for Plaintiff's legal rights and personal wellbeing.
- 146. Plaintiff has been harmed in that Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, actual, consequential, and incidental financial losses, including, without limitation, loss of income, salary and benefits, and the intangible loss of employment-related opportunities for growth in Plaintiff's field and damage to Plaintiff's professional reputation, all in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
- 147. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, substantial losses of earnings and employment benefits, and has suffered humiliation, embarrassment, mental and emotional distress and discomfort, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount proven at trial.
- 148. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the aforesaid acts directed toward Plaintiff by Defendants were carried out with a conscious disregard of Plaintiff's right to be free from such illegal behavior, such as to constitute oppression, fraud, or malice pursuant to section 3294 of the California Civil Code, among other provisions, entitling Plaintiff to punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish and set an example of Defendants.
- 149. The actions alleged herein were taken by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant and/or ratified by managing agents and/or officers of Defendant, namely, Jose Huizar and Paul Habib. In so doing, said managing agents and/or officers of Defendant acted with

1	oppression and malice as those terms are used in section 3294 of the California Civil Code.				
2	As such, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.				
3					
4	JURY TRIAL DEMAND				
5	Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial to resolve each and every one of the claims averred				
6	in this Complaint against each and every Defendant.				
7					
8	PRAYER FOR RELIEF				
9	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them,				
10	according to proof, as follows:				
11	On the First Cause of Action for Retaliation (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (h)):				
12	1. For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;				
13	2. For compensatory and emotional distress damages;				
14	3. For punitive and exemplary damages				
15	4. For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;				
16	5. For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;				
17	6. For an award of prejudgment interest;				
18	7. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.				
19	On the Second Cause for Retaliation (Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5(b)):				
20	1. For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;				
21	2. For compensatory and emotional distress damages;				
22	3. For punitive and exemplary damages				
23	4. For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;				
24	5. For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;				
25	For an award of prejudgment interest;				
26	7. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.				
27					

1	On the Third Cause for Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy:		
2	1.	For actual and money damages;	
3	2.	For compensatory and emotional distress damages;	
4	3.	For an award of prejudgment interest;	
5	4.	For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.	
6	On the Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination (Cal. Gov. Code		
7	§ 12940(k)):		
8	1.	For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;	
9	2.	For compensatory and emotional distress damages;	
10	3.	For punitive and exemplary damages	
11	4.	For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;	
12	5.	For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;	
13	6.	For an award of prejudgment interest;	
14	7.	For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.	
15	On the Fifth	Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment (Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940(a),	
16	(h), (j)):		
17	1.	For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial;	
18	2.	For compensatory and emotional distress damages;	
19	3.	For punitive and exemplary damages	
20	4.	For Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys' fees;	
21	5.	For Plaintiff's reasonable experts' fees;	
22	6.	For an award of prejudgment interest;	
23	7.	For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.	
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On the Sixth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: 1. For actual and money damages in an amount according to proof at trial; 2. For compensatory and emotional distress damages;

- 3. For punitive and exemplary damages
- 4. For an award of prejudgment interest;
- 5. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED: October 30, 2018

THE LAW OFFICE OF TERRENCE JONES



Terrence Jones

Attorneys for Plaintiff PAULINE MEDINA

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VERIFICATION

(Pursuant to C.C.P. § 446)

I, PAULINE MEDINA, hereby state, declare, and verify as follows:

- I am the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter. I have read the foregoing Verified Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint"), and know the contents thereof.
- The information supplied therein is based on my own personal knowledge, knowledge personally provided or made available to me by my friends, family, associates, and legal counsel and other agents.
- 3. The information contained in the Complaint document is true, except as to the matters which are therein stated upon information and belief, and, as to those matters, I am informed and reasonably believe to be true.

Under penalty of perjury in accordance with the law of the State of California, I declare the foregoing to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed this 30th day of October 2018, within Los Angeles County, California.

Pauline Medina

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Exhibit A



DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

2218 Kausen Drive, Suite 100 | Elk Grove | CA | 95758 (800) 884-1684 (Voice) | (800) 700-2320 (TTY) | California's Relay Service at 711 http://www.dfeh.ca.gov | email: contact.center@dfeh.ca.gov

October 30, 2018

Terrence Jones 6737 Bright Avenue, Suite B6 Whittier, California 90601

RE: Notice to Complainant's Attorney

DFEH Matter Number: 201810-04073930

Right to Sue: Medina / City of Los Angeles et al.

Dear Terrence Jones:

Attached is a copy of your complaint of discrimination filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et seq. Also attached is a copy of your Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue.

Pursuant to Government Code section 12962, DFEH will not serve these documents on the employer. You must serve the complaint separately, to all named respondents. Please refer to the attached Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue for information regarding filing a private lawsuit in the State of California. A courtesy "Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint" is attached for your convenience.

Be advised that the DFEH does not review or edit the complaint form to ensure that it meets procedural or statutory requirements.

Sincerely,

Department of Fair Employment and Housing





DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

2218 Kausen Drive, Suite 100 | Elk Grove | CA | 95758 (800) 884-1684 (Voice) | (800) 700-2320 (TTY) | California's Relay Service at 711 http://www.dfeh.ca.gov | email: contact.center@dfeh.ca.gov

October 30, 2018

RE: Notice of Filing of Discrimination Complaint

DFEH Matter Number: 201810-04073930

Right to Sue: Medina / City of Los Angeles et al.

To All Respondent(s):

Enclosed is a copy of a complaint of discrimination that has been filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) in accordance with Government Code section 12960. This constitutes service of the complaint pursuant to Government Code section 12962. The complainant has requested an authorization to file a lawsuit. This case is not being investigated by DFEH and is being closed immediately. A copy of the Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue is enclosed for your records.

Please refer to the attached complaint for a list of all respondent(s) and their contact information.

No response to DFEH is requested or required.

Sincerely,

Department of Fair Employment and Housing



DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT & HOUSING

2218 Kausen Drive, Suite 100 | Elk Grove | CA | 95758 (800) 884-1684 (Voice) | (800) 700-2320 (TTY) | California's Relay Service at 711 http://www.dfeh.ca.gov | email: contact.center@dfeh.ca.gov

October 30, 2018

Pauline Medina

RE: Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue

DFEH Matter Number: 201810-04073930

Right to Sue: Medina / City of Los Angeles et al.

Dear Pauline Medina.

This letter informs you that the above-referenced complaint was filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) has been closed effective October 30, 2018 because an immediate Right to Sue notice was requested. DFEH will take no further action on the complaint.

This letter is also your Right to Sue notice. According to Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), a civil action may be brought under the provisions of the Fair Employment and Housing Act against the person, employer, labor organization or employment agency named in the above-referenced complaint. The civil action must be filed within one year from the date of this letter.

To obtain a federal Right to Sue notice, you must contact the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to file a complaint within 30 days of receipt of this DFEH Notice of Case Closure or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is earlier.

Sincerely,

Department of Fair Employment and Housing

COMPLAINT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BEFORE THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING Under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seg.)

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In the Matter of the Complaint of 5 Pauline Medina

City of Los Angeles

200 N. Spring Street Room 360

DFEH No. 201810-04073930

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VS.

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Los Angeles, California 90012 10

Jose Huizar

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- Respondents
- 1. Respondent City of Los Angeles is an employer subject to suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.).
- 2. Complainant Pauline Medina, resides in the City of State of .

Complainant,

- 3. Complainant alleges that on or about June 20, 2018, respondent took the following adverse actions:
- Complainant was harassed because of complainant's disability (physical or mental), medical condition (cancer or genetic characteristic), age (40 and over).
- Complainant was discriminated against because of complainant's disability (physical or mental), medical condition (cancer or genetic characteristic), age (40 and over), other and as a result of the discrimination was terminated, forced to guit. reprimanded, demoted, denied a work environment free of discrimination and/or retaliation, denied any employment benefit or privilege, denied reasonable accommodation for a disability, denied work opportunities or assignments.
- Complainant experienced retaliation because complainant reported or resisted any form of discrimination or harassment, participated as a witness in a discrimination or harassment claim, requested or used a disability-related

Complaint - DFEH No. 201810-04073930

Date Filed: October 30, 2018

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accommodation and as a result was terminated, reprimanded, denied a work environment free of discrimination and/or retaliation, denied reasonable accommodation for a disability.

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Additional Complaint Details: Complainant Pauline Medina was subjected to unlawful harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) on account of her: sick leave; disability; disability leave; and complaints of potential violations of local, state, and federal law. Complainant was employed by the City of Los Angeles (the "City") and worked for Jose Huizar, the City's Councilmember for its 14th District. At the time of her constructive termination on June 20, 2018, Plaintiff was employed as Huizar's office manager and lead administrator. Huizar constructively terminated Complainant from that position as retaliation for her FEHA-protected classes and activities. Among other reasons, Huizar demoted Ms. Medina as reprisal for: (i) voicing concerns and complaining about having to funnel City money to Huizar's high school alma mater; (ii) voicing concerns and complaining about having to secretly use City funds to pay for Huizar's personal expenses; (iii) voicing concerns and complaining about the preferential treatment Huizar was giving to a City staffer with whom he was having an extramarital affair; and (iv) taking disability and sick leave as recommended by her primary care physician. In response to Plaintiff's protected activities, from in or about October 2017 and continuing to in or about June 2018. Huizar and the City retaliated against Complainant, including, but not limited to: harassing and hassling Complainant both during and outside of normal work hours; stripping Complainant of certain duties and responsibilities she had long held in the office; stripping Complainant of access to Huizar's calendar; subjecting Complainant to unreasonable and unjustified criticism of her work; subjecting Complainant to unsympathetic criticism for taking time off for health reasons; and unjustifiably subjecting Complainant to an attendance audit by the City's Personnel Department. As a result of being stripped of any meaningful function with her employer. Complainant was constructively terminated. Huizar and the City intentionally created and knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable that any reasonable and comparably-situated employee would be compelled to resign.

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VERIFICATION

I, **Terrence Jones**, am the **Attorney** in the above-entitled complaint. I have read the foregoing complaint and know the contents thereof. The matters alleged are based on information and belief, which I believe to be true.

On October 30, 2018, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Whittier, California

CONTRACT CON

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